美国国家应急规划情景（2006）中文简译 之 情景6：化学攻击 – 有毒工业化学品
写在前面：情景构建是近年来公共安全管理领域最热门的专业方法之一，对应急准备规划、应急预案管理和应急培训演练等一系列应急管理工作实践具有不可或缺的支撑和指导作用，对企业的应急、连续性和危机管理也意义重大。为学习情景构建方法和推进企业级情景构建项目，我在今年3月份组织了一个公益翻译小组（小组成员征募链接： https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/Ua-JgZUIUY4xHEbsN8qiXQ），对一些主要的情景构建资料进行翻译。7月份前后，翻译小组成员陆续将翻译文稿发送给我，近期我会将这些资料审校完成，陆续在公众号发布。
刘铁民在《重大突发事件情景规划与构建研究》一文中指出：《美国国家应急规划情景》（2006）由美国国土安全部组织了近1500名应急管理官员和来自大专院校与科研单位的科学家，经过一年多的调查研究，认真总结回顾了之前发生在美国和其他国家的重大突发事件典型案例，尤其是对未来可能发生重大突发事件的风险做了系统分析与评估，对可能发生事件的初始来源、破坏严重性、波及范围、复杂程度以及长期潜在影响作了系统归纳和收敛。经过反复多次评审和修改，总结提出15种重大突发事件情景是美国面临最严重的风险和挑战，这些情景被列为国家应急准备战略最优先考虑的应对目标。为强调对应急预案编制工作的指导性，又进一步把这15种重大突发事件情景整合集成为具有共性特点的8个重要情景组（如下表），使应急准备的重心更加聚焦。
| 重要情景组 | 国家预案编制情景 |
|---|---|
| 1.爆炸物攻击—使用自制爆炸装置进行爆炸 | 情景12：爆炸物攻击—使用自制爆炸装置进行爆炸 |
| 2.核攻击 | 情景1：核爆炸—自制核装置 |
| 3.辐射攻击—辐射扩散装置 | 情景11：辐射学攻击—辐射学扩展装置 |
| 4.生物学攻击—附病原体附件 | 情景2：生物学攻击—炭疽气溶胶 情景4：生物学攻击 情景13：生物学攻击—食品污染 情景14：生物学攻击—体表损伤皮肤疾病 |
| 5.化学攻击—附各种毒剂附件 | 情景5：化学攻击 情景6：化学攻击—有毒工业化学品 情景7：化学攻击—神经毒气 情景8：化学攻击-氯容品爆炸 |
| 6.自然灾害—附各种灾害附件 | 情景9：自然灾害—大地震 情景10：自然灾害—大飓风 |
| 7.计算机网络攻击 | 情景15：网络攻击 |
| 8.传染病流感 | 情景3：生物学疾病暴发—大流行性流感 |
本篇为《美国国家应急规划情景》（2006）中文简译的”情景6：化学攻击 — 有毒工业化学品”部分，其中，情景4、5、6由公益翻译团队专家：
薛春娟（浙江舟山，793571689@qq.com） 林红梅（深圳，linhongmeirene@163.com）
合力完成，感谢公益翻译团队的专家抽出个人休息时间进行翻译工作。
以下译文由我负责最终统一审校定稿，如译文中有任何不准确或理解错误的地方，都是由于我的原因造成，与诸位翻译人员无关。如对译文有意见或修改建议，请给我留言。
王曙(kevinwang) 2024.11.30
情景6：化学攻击 – 有毒工业化学品 Scenario 6: Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals
| 项目 | 描述 |
|---|---|
| 伤亡情况 Casualties | 350人死亡；1,000人住院治疗 350 fatalities; 1,000 hospitalizations |
| 基础设施损坏 Infrastructure Damage | 爆炸区域内的50%建筑物受损 50% of structures in area of explosion |
| 撤离与流离失所者 Evacuations/Displaced Persons | 10,000人撤离；1,000人在安全区避护；25,000人接到指示在烟雾扩散至区域内时暂时就地避难；100,000人自行撤离该地区 10,000 evacuated; 1,000 seek shelter in safe areas; 25,000 instructed to shelter-in-place; 100,000 self-evacuate |
| 污染情况 Contamination | 是 Yes |
| 经济影响 Economic Impact | 数十亿美元 Billions of dollars |
| 多重事件的可能性 Potential for Multiple Events | 是 Yes |
| 恢复时间表 Recovery Timeline | 数月 Months |
6.1 情景概述 Scenario Overview：
6.1.1 一般描述 General Description —
在这一情景中，来自”通用对手”（Universal Adversary，UA）的恐怖分子——以激进的什叶派穆斯林组织法里卡拉（Fariqallah）为代表——对一家石油、石油产品及润滑油（POL）炼油厂发动了远程武器攻击。与此同时，多个车载爆炸装置（Vehicle-Borne Explosive Device，VBIED）在当地港口被引爆，目标包括海岸警卫队站点和两艘正在码头卸货的商船。这两艘船中，一艘装载了易燃材料。在船只燃烧过程中，将释放出钴、镍、钼、镉、汞、钒、铂以及其他金属的烟雾。另外，一艘燃烧的船只还载有工业化学品，包括异腈、氮化物和环氧树脂。现场由于爆炸冲击波和碎片、火灾，以及有毒工业化学品（TIC）的蒸汽和液体接触，造成了人员伤亡。下风方向的人员由于吸入有毒蒸汽也出现了伤亡。
In this scenario, terrorists from the Universal Adversary (UA), represented by Fariqallah, a radical Shi’ite Muslim group, conduct a standoff weapon attack on a Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) refinery. At the same time, multiple Vehicle-Borne Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) are detonated in a local port, targeting a Coast Guard station and two merchant ships that are offloading at the docks. One of the ships is loaded with flammable materials. As the ships burn, plumes of cobalt, nickel, molybdenum, cadmium, mercury, vanadium, platinum, and other metals are released. An additional burning ship contains industrial chemicals, including isocyanates, nitrides, and epoxy resins. Casualties occur at the scene as a result of blast/shock wave, fragmentation, fires, and TIC vapor and liquid contact. Downwind casualties also occur from vapor inhalation.
6.1.2 详细情景 Detailed Scenario —
几个隶属于”通用对手”（UA）的国内恐怖组织的潜伏小组领导人通过加密电子邮件接到通知，要求与”UA中央指挥部”的一名代表会面。这名代表伪装成合法商人，前往并在美国境内活动。一些小组领导人分别接到指示，开始收集武器并组装车载爆炸装置（VBIED）；另一些小组领导人则被指示在美国的几个主要港口设施进行隐密且长期的侦察活动。
The leaders of several sleeper cells of a domestic terrorist organization affiliated with the UA are notified via coded e-mail to meet with a representative of UA Central Command, who travels to and around the United States posing as a legitimate businessman. Some cell leaders are individually instructed to begin weapons acquisition and VBIED assembly; others are instructed to conduct discreet, long-term surveillance of several major port facilities in the United States.
接着，“通用对手”（UA）通过其在航运业的关系，将两箱火箭推进式榴弹（RPG）及发射器以海运集装箱的形式运往美国。作为每天进入美国的6000多个集装箱之一，这个集装箱从一个合法的来源发货，通过海关检查后顺利抵达，并最终交付给一个潜伏小组。
UA then uses contacts in the shipping industry to have two crates of Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and launchers shipped to the United States in a sea-borne cargo container. As one of more than 6,000 arriving in the United States daily, and shipped from a legitimate source, the container passes through customs without suspicion and is finally delivered to a sleeper cell.
经过两年的监视活动，“通用对手”（UA）中央指挥部决定袭击一个邻近石油炼化设施的美国港口。UA的行动人员利用航空炸弹制作了两枚大型简易爆炸装置（IED），将这些武器装入货箱，然后放入集装箱中。这两枚IED都配备了远程触发装置，并设置了诱杀装置（booby traps）以确保最终引爆。通过相同的海运联系，这两个集装箱被分别装载到不同的船只上运输，但都计划在同一天抵达港口。
After two years of surveillance activities, UA Central Command decides to attack a U.S. port with nearby petroleum refining facilities. Using aerial bombs, UA operatives fashion two huge Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). These weapons are placed in crates and then into shipping containers. Both IEDs are equipped with remote triggering devices and are booby-trapped to ensure final detonation. Using the same shipping contacts, the two containers are shipped on separate vessels, but timed to arrive at the port on the same day.
“通用对手”（UA）领导层挑选了四名拥有清白记录和合法旅行证件的行动人员。这四名男子随后接受了炮兵训练。在使用UA控制的BM-21”喀秋莎”火箭发射器的过程中，这支小组练习将火箭发射管焊接到一辆商业购买的1995年款福特F700自卸卡车的车厢上。为确保团队能够在武器的最大射程（约15,000米，即9英里）内锁定并打击区域目标，他们进行了实弹射击训练。训练内容还包括部署前方观察员，以及观察员和射击手之间的通信，以便调整火力瞄准目标。此外，UA小组成员还制造了三辆装有VBIED（车载简易爆炸装置）的自卸卡车，每辆卡车配备1,500磅的硝酸铵燃料油（ANFO）和C-4塑性炸药形状装药。
UA leadership identifies four operatives with clean records and legitimate traveling documents. These four men then undergo artillery training. Working on UA-controlled BM-21 Katyusha Rocket Launchers, the group practices welding the rocket launch tubes onto the bed of a commercially purchased 1995 Ford F700 dump truck. To ensure that the team can engage and destroy area targets at the maximum effective range of the weapon (approximately 15,000 meters or 9 miles), they practice live-fire training. Training also includes the deployment of forward observers and communications between the observer(s) and the shooter to adjust fires onto the intended target(s). Additionally, the UA cell builds three VBIED-carrying dump trucks, each equipped with 1,500 pounds of ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO) and C-4 shape charges.
在袭击当天，三辆车载简易爆炸装置（VBIED）突破目标周边防线，并在3分钟内被引爆。这些VBIED造成了严重破坏。停靠在附近的船只以及在码头堆放的集装箱发生了二次爆炸和火灾。爆炸产生的烟流中含有危险物质（HAZMAT），包括钴、镍、钼、镉、汞、钒和铂。一艘燃烧的船上装有工业化学品，包括异腈、氮化物和环氧树脂。现场由于爆炸冲击波、碎片、火灾以及有毒工业化学品（TIC）的蒸汽和液体接触，造成了人员伤亡。下风方向的人员由于吸入有毒蒸汽也出现了伤亡。
On the day of the attack, the three VBIEDs breach their target perimeters and are detonated within a 3-minute span. The VBIEDs cause severe damage. Secondary explosions and fires occur onboard vessels that are docked nearby and in containers stacked along the piers. The resulting plumes contain HAZMAT including cobalt, nickel, molybdenum, cadmium, mercury, vanadium, and platinum. A burning ship contains industrial chemicals, including isocyanates, nitrides, and epoxy resins. Casualties occur at the scene as a result of blast, fragmentation, fires, and TIC vapor and liquid contact. Downwind casualties also occur from vapor inhalation.
火箭小组在最后一辆车载简易爆炸装置（VBIED）引爆几分钟内成功对炼油厂发起攻击。两枚火箭击中炼油厂中心附近，损坏了一座加氢裂化塔，并点燃了一个汽油储罐。在完成瞄准校准后，剩余的火箭随即发射，引发了多处火灾，并破坏了占地数英亩的设备。此次袭击造成了灾难性的后果。炼油厂的加氢裂化系统和催化裂化系统也相续着火。在袭击开始后一小时内，幸存的袭击小组成员撤离了城市。
The rocket team successfully launches against the refinery a few minutes after the last VBIED detonation. Two rockets strike near the center of the refinery, damaging a hydrocracking tower and setting a gasoline storage tank on fire. With aim calibrated, the remaining rockets are fired, starting numerous fires and destroying acres of equipment. The attack results in a catastrophic scenario. The refinery’s hydrocracking and catalytic cracking units are also on fire. Within an hour of the attack, surviving attack team members have left the city.
6.2 规划考虑因素 Planning Considerations：
6.2.1 地理考虑因素/描述 Geographical Considerations/Description —
港口的规模和位置以及下风方向的受影响人口可以根据当地条件进行调整。对于内陆地区，可以将港口替换为河港或大型铁路设施。
Size and location of the port and downwind population at risk can be adjusted to meet local conditions. A river port or a large rail facility could be substituted for the port for inland jurisdictions.
6.2.2 时间线/事件动态 Timeline/Event Dynamics —
策划和准备此次袭击的总时间大约需要两年，包括侦察、武器训练和武器的积累。执行袭击的时间约需数周，用于协调运输并确保集装箱分别搭乘不同的船只同时到达港口。每个地点的实地行动时间为2到3分钟。袭击引起的火灾可能需要数小时甚至数天才能扑灭。
Total time to plan and prepare for the attack would be on the order of 2 years, including reconnaissance, weapons training, and accumulation of weapons. Time to execute the attack would be several weeks to coordinate the shipping and coincident arrival of the containers aboard separate ships at the port. On-site action at each location takes 2 to 3 minutes. Fires resulting from the attack may take hours to days to extinguish.
6.2.3 气象条件 Meteorological Conditions —
风速、温度、湿度和降水是化学攻击成功的决定性因素。
Wind speed, temperature, humidity, and precipitation determine the success or failure of a chemical attack.
风速：风速决定了主云团的移动速度。较高的风速会迅速扩散蒸气、气溶胶和液体，从而缩小目标区域并减少人群接触到化学剂的机会。最适合袭击的风速为4到6节（约7到11公里/小时）。 Wind Speed: Wind speed determines how fast a primary cloud moves. High winds can disperse vapors, aerosols, and liquids rapidly, thereby shrinking the target area and reducing the population’s exposure to the agents. The best wind speed for an attack is between 4 and 6 knots.
温度：较高的空气温度可能会导致气溶胶颗粒蒸发，减小其大小，并增加其进入肺部的可能性。最适合袭击的空气温度为65ºF到75ºF（约18到24摄氏度）。 Temperature: Higher air temperatures may cause the evaporation of aerosol particles, thereby decreasing their size and increasing the chance that they will reach the lungs. The best air temperature for an attack is between 65ºF and 75ºF.
湿度：较高的湿度可能导致气溶胶颗粒变大，从而减少被吸入的气溶胶量。最适合袭击的低湿度范围为30%到40%。 Humidity: High humidity may lead to the enlargement of aerosol particles, thereby reducing the quantity of aerosol inhaled. The best low-range humidity for an attack is between 30% and 40%.
降水：最适合袭击的条件是无降水。 Precipitation: The best condition for an attack is no precipitation.
6.2.4 假设 Assumptions —
实际下风方向蒸气危害区内有七千人。现场仅有少数人被危险液体污染。第一响应人员将命令立即疏散受到火灾威胁的区域。在第一枚二次装置爆炸后，疏散范围将扩大到以目标为中心向所有方向1,000码（约914米）。一旦确认涉及一种或多种有毒工业化学品（TIC），将命令北偏东北方向45°弧形区域的居民就地避难，范围延伸6英里（约9.7公里）；这一命令将影响多达700,000人。该区域内许多人将自行疏散，导致道路拥堵并延误应急资源的部署。然而，当当局无法迅速确认所涉及的具体有毒工业化学品（TIC）并开始出现人员伤亡时，为减少法律责任，他们将选择扩大疏散范围，覆盖上述区域。
Seven thousand people are in the actual downwind-vapor hazard area. Few are contaminated with hazardous liquids on scene. First responders will order the evacuation of areas immediately threatened by fire. After the first secondary device explodes, they will increase the area of evacuation to 1,000 yards in all directions from the target site. Once it is determined that one or more TICs are involved, shelter-in-place will be ordered for those in a 45-degree arc north-northeast, extending 6 miles; this order will affect up to 700,000 people. Many in this area will self-evacuate, causing road congestion and delaying the deployment of emergency resources. However, when the authorities cannot rapidly identify the specific TIC involved and casualties begin to occur, to reduce legal liability they will expand the evacuation to cover this area.
现场温度高于所涉及有毒工业化学品（TIC）的冰点。 Temperature is above the freezing point of involved TICs.
武器进口未被执法或情报机构发现。VBIED和火箭车能够规避所有安保措施以实施袭击。 Importation of weapons is not detected by law enforcement or intelligence communities. VBIEDs and a rocket truck are able to evade any security precautions long enough to conduct the attack.
6.2.5 激活的使命领域 Mission Areas Activated —
6.2.5.1 预防/威慑： 预防袭击的能力取决于阻止武器获取、简易爆炸装置（IED）组装和现场侦察。威慑措施需要通过在袭击发生前及发生期间显著加强安保和提高抓捕潜力来实施。 Prevention/Deterrence: The ability to prevent the attack is contingent on preventing weapons acquisition, IED assembly, and site reconnaissance. Deterrence measures must be taken by visibly increasing security and apprehension potential at the site before and during the attack.
6.2.5.2 应急评估/诊断： 多种化学品的存在和暴露症状将极大地增加评估和识别工作的复杂性。对现场应急人员和应急指挥中心（EOC）工作人员测试的袭击期间和之后的行动包括：调度，有毒工业化学品（TIC）检测，危险评估、预测、监测和取样。 Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis: The presence of multiple chemicals and exposure symptoms will greatly complicate assessment and identification efforts. Actions of incident-site and EOC personnel tested during and after the attack include dispatch; TIC detection; and hazard assessment, prediction, monitoring, and sampling.
6.2.5.3 应急管理/响应： 这是一起大规模事件，下风烟流中可能有数万人受到潜在暴露威胁。在化学剂泄露被控制之前，数千人可能丧生。对现场应急人员、应急指挥中心（EOC）和联合信息中心（JIC）工作人员测试的袭击发生后的行动包括：警报发布，应急启动与通知，交通与通行控制，特殊人群保护，资源支持和援助请求以及公众信息传播活动。 Emergency Management/Response: This is a large-scale incident with tens of thousands of potential exposures in the downwind plume. Thousands may die before the release is contained. Actions of incident-site, EOC, and JIC personnel tested after the attack include alerts, activation and notification, traffic and access control, protection of special populations, resource support and assistance requests, and public information activities.
6.2.5.4 灾害缓解： 多种有毒工业化学品（TIC）的存在将使缓解措施变得复杂。还需考虑二次装置的威胁（即简易爆炸装置（IED）的延迟远程引爆）。对现场应急人员测试的袭击发生后的行动包括：隔离和界定危险区域，建立、规划并运行事件指挥系统，灭火，执行炸弹处置和简易爆炸装置（IED）拆除程序，保护现场，实施缓解措施，对应急响应人员进行去污，以及开展现场修复与监测工作。 Hazard Mitigation: Mitigation measures will be complicated by multiple TICs. Secondary device concerns (i.e., delayed remote detonation of IEDs) will also have to be taken into account. Actions of incident-site personnel tested after the attack include isolating and defining the hazard; establishing, planning, and operating an incident command system; extinguishing fires; executing bomb disposal and IED render-safe procedures; securing the site; implementing mitigating measures; decontaminating response personnel; and conducting site restoration and monitoring.
6.2.5.5 疏散/避护： 下风方向的人群将需要进行撤离和/或避难。下风区域内有两家医院，需要对这些地点采取保护措施。对现场应急人员、地方人员和应急指挥中心（EOC）工作人员测试的袭击发生后的行动包括接待点和避难所的运营以及兽医服务。 Evacuation/Shelter: Evacuation and/or sheltering of downwind populations will be required. Two hospitals are in the downwind area and protective action will need to be taken at those locations. Actions of incident-site, local-area, and EOC personnel tested after the attack include reception-site and shelter operations and veterinary services.
6.2.5.6 受害者护理： 一小时内，已有超过1,000人受重伤，包括创伤、烧伤和吸入烟雾。另有数百人因严重呼吸窘迫、癫痫发作和/或昏迷而受影响。可能多达数千名受害者需要呼吸支持。数千人可能需要短期或长期治疗。一些受害者需要进行去污处理。对现场、地方、医院和应急指挥中心（EOC）工作人员测试的袭击发生后的行动包括：保护措施决策与沟通，紧急救助，搜救与救援，治疗与稳定病情，患者筛查与去污，患者运输，患者状况报告，医院治疗，遗体处理以及通知近亲。 Victim Care: Within an hour, there are more than 1,000 persons with severe injuries that include trauma, burns, and smoke inhalation. There are hundreds more in the area with severe respiratory distress, seizures, and/or comas. Up to thousands of victims may require respiratory assistance. Thousands may require short- or long-term treatment. Some victims will require decontamination. Actions of incident-site, local-area, hospital, and EOC personnel tested after the attack include protective action decision-making and communication; emergency medical services; search and rescue; treatment and stabilization; patient screening and decontamination; patient transportation; patient tracking and reporting; hospital treatment; fatality management; and notification of next of kin.
6.2.5.7 调查/抓捕： 在穿戴个人防护装备（PPE）的情况下，在工业区内搜寻嫌疑人和证据将是一项重大挑战。对现场应急人员测试的袭击发生后的行动包括：调度，现场控制，刑事调查，追捕和战术部署，以及对嫌疑人的抓捕。 Investigation/Apprehension: Searching for suspects and evidence in an industrial area while wearing PPE will be a significant challenge. Actions of incident-site personnel tested after the attack include dispatch, site control, criminal investigation, pursuit and tactical deployment, and apprehension of suspects.
6.2.5.8 恢复/补救： 去污/清理：所需的去污程度取决于具体的有毒工业化学品（TIC）。无论如何，对大型工业港口设施和炼油厂进行监测和采样将是一项挑战。现场应急人员的行动包括：对受污染区域进行去污处理，处理去污废物，进行环境测试，修复被破坏/受损的设施，以及开展公众信息传播活动。 Decontamination/Cleanup: The extent of decontamination required will depend on the TIC. Regardless, monitoring and sampling a large industrial port facility and refineries will be a challenge. Actions of incident-site personnel include decontamination of contaminated areas, disposal of decontamination waste, environmental testing, repair of destroyed/damaged facilities, and public information activities.
场地恢复：袭击及其引发的火灾将对港口和炼油厂造成重大损害。某些材料的去污可能非常困难甚至无法实现。对水道的去污可能也是一项巨大挑战。特别是炼油厂的现场修复将成为主要难题。环境影响问题可能会显著延缓重建工作。 Site Restoration: There will be significant damage to the port and refineries as a direct result of the attack and subsequent fires. Decontamination of some materials may be difficult or impossible. Decontamination of the waterway may present a significant challenge as well. Site restoration will be a major problem, particularly for the refinery. Environmental impact concerns may significantly delay reconstruction.
6.3 影响 Implications：
6.3.1 次生灾害/事件 Secondary Hazards/Events —
一旦当局了解情况，他们将疏散或下令下风方向炼油厂和港口附近的大范围区域就地避难。随着下风方向开始出现伤亡，人群恐慌将导致大量受伤。周围道路上的机动车事故可能会进一步增加伤亡。水道可能因此受到严重污染，包括因沉船或着火船只导致的石油和货物泄漏。
Once they grasp the situation, authorities will evacuate or order shelter-in-place for a significant area downwind of the refineries and the port. Numerous injuries will occur as a result of population panic once downwind casualties begin to occur. Further injuries are likely to occur due to motor vehicle accidents on surrounding roadways. The waterway may become heavily contaminated, including from oil and cargo spills from sunken or burning ships.
6.3.2 伤亡情况 Fatalities/Injuries —
假设一个人口密集的地区，可能有7,000人处于实际的下风区域。其中，5%（即350人）将接触到致命剂量的暴露，而这些人中有一半（约175人）将在接受治疗之前或过程中死亡。另外15%（约1,050人）将需要住院治疗，其余的人将在现场接受由急救医疗服务（EMS）人员的治疗并被释放。然而，可能约有70,000名”担忧但健康”的人可能会前往当地医疗设施寻求治疗。
Assuming a densely populated area, 7,000 people may be in the actual downwind area. Of these, 5% (350) will receive lethal exposures, and half of these will die before or during treatment. An additional 15% will require hospitalization, and the remainder will be treated and released at the scene by EMS personnel. However, up to approximately 70,000 “worried but well” may present at local medical facilities.
以下问题和及其导致的死亡和伤害包括： The following problems and resultant fatalities/injuries occur:
疏散期间的恐慌造成7人死亡和70人受伤（按每10万人疏散者中1人死亡、10人受伤计算）。 Panic during evacuation results in seven fatalities and 70 injuries (based on 1/100,000 and 10/100,000 evacuated).
火灾将造成15人死亡和50人受伤。 Fires will result in 15 fatalities and 50 injuries.
液体污染将造成3人死亡和350人受伤（其中35人永久残疾）。 Liquid contamination will result in 3 fatalities and 350 injuries (35 permanently disabled).
蒸汽、颗粒物和气溶胶暴露将造成175人死亡（接受致命剂量的一半患者死亡）和1,400人受伤（其中140人永久残疾）。 Vapor, particulate, and aerosol exposure will result in 175 fatalities (half of those who receive lethal doses) and 1,400 injuries (140 permanently disabled).
6.3.3 财产损失 Property Damage —
所有三座炼油厂均遭受重大损害，其中50%的设备和设施需要进行大规模修复或更换。港口的两艘船在泊位处沉没；港口附近以及一打（约12处）IED（简易爆炸装置）爆炸点将受到严重破坏。根据释放的化学物质种类，下风区可能会发生严重的财产损失。这些损失可能直接由化学物质的腐蚀作用造成，也可能由去污方法的腐蚀性副作用引起。
All three refineries sustain significant damage, with 50% of the equipment and facilities requiring significant repairs or replacement. Two ships in the port sink at their moorings; the port sustains heavy damage near the ships and at a dozen points where IEDs were dropped. Depending on which chemicals are released, significant property damage may occur downwind. This damage may be caused directly by the corrosive effects of the chemicals or by the corrosive side effects of decontamination methods.
6.3.4 服务中断 Service Disruption —
美国西海岸的炼油能力显著下降，导致燃料短缺和价格上涨。港口因爆炸损坏以及有毒工业化学品（TIC）和重金属污染而暂时关闭，对该地区经济造成重大影响。对周边区域的环境调查结果表明，港口下风区域的多个街区需要长期撤离。水道污染可能需要清理，同时可能实施使用限制，包括长期禁止游泳和捕鱼。此外，由于污染，一些公共交通系统和其他设施可能被废弃。通讯系统（包括固定电话和移动网络）因需求激增而中断。由于伤员和”担忧但健康”人群的大量涌入，医疗系统将受到严重干扰。
Refinery capacity on the West Coast is significantly diminished, resulting in fuel shortages and price increases. The port is temporarily closed due to bomb damage and TIC and heavy metal contamination, with significant economic impacts on the region. Environmental surveys of the surrounding area indicate that several blocks downwind of the port will require long-term evacuation. The waterway may require cleanup and use restrictions, including long-term bans on swimming and fishing. Additionally, some public transit systems and other facilities may be abandoned due to contamination. Communications systems may be disrupted due to demand surge. The medical system will be severely disrupted by the surge of casualties and “worried but well.”
6.3.5 经济影响 Economic Impact —
对炼油厂主要部分的去污、销毁、处置以及更换可能耗资数十亿美元。港口的修复成本预计也将达到类似水平。港口的损失将对美国与环太平洋地区的贸易产生重大影响。此外，由于消费者信心的下降，袭击可能引发全国范围内的经济衰退。
Decontamination, destruction, disposal, and replacement of major portions of the refineries could cost billions of dollars. Similar costs could be expected at the port. Loss of the port will have a significant impact on U.S. trade with the Pacific Rim. Additionally, an overall national economic downturn may be triggered by the loss of consumer confidence.
6.3.6 长期健康问题 Long-Term Health Issues —
这些问题高度依赖于接触的有毒工业化学品（TIC）的种类及其暴露程度。除了其毒性影响外，许多有毒工业化学品（TIC）还被确认具有致癌性。根据所接触TIC的种类，可能会对内脏器官和眼睛造成长期损害。
These issues are highly dependent on which TIC exposures occur and to what degree they occur. In addition to their toxic effects, many are known carcinogens. Long-term damage to internal organs and eyes is possible, depending on which TICs are present.